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CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 
IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
g f  N  T H I S  E S S A Y ,  W E  R E E X A M I N E  A  C R I T I C A L  P A R A D O X  IN
,.v international and comparative industrial relations, a paradox 
that already decades ago demonstrated its ability to intrigue 
scholarly curiosity (Galenson, 1952,1963; Kerr et al., i960). As we 
y see it, convergence along a number of important dimensions,
A such as labor law and organizational and bargaining structure, is 
occurring simultaneously with widespread cross-national and local 
divergence, or diversity, in industrial relations practices and out­
comes. Along with economic and political interdependence and with 
intensifications of market competition, convergence and diversity 
both appear to be product of an increasing spread of markets and 
ideas sometimes referred to as “globalization.”
In employing this term, we intend to make the point that the con­
duct of global business is no longer confined to the sort of interna­
tional trading and related activities that have been carried on for 
centuries already. In the modern era, the production and exchange of 
both goods and services occur increasingly on a global scale (Reich, 
1991). At this level, as capital mobility expands and trade agreements 
proliferate (NAFTA, CATT, the single European market), national gov­
ernments find it increasingly difficult to regulate markets. This global­
ization of markets, we suggest, is the dominant force driving change 
(whether toward convergence or diversity) in the contemporary pe­
riod. Our observations are especially applicable to the advanced indus­
trial countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the primary focus of this paper, although the 
trends identified here probably also hold to some extent for newly 
industrialized countries and less developed societies as well.
Convergence can be seen, for example, in the role of law and gov­
ernment. In the 1930s and 1960s, as we indicate in more detail below, 
law in the United States emphasized procedure and left substantive 
outcomes to the bargaining partners, whereas to a large extent the re­
verse was true of continental Europe. Since the 1960s, however, the 
United States has turned to more substantive rule-making by govern­
ment, especially in employment legislation. Conversely, many Western 
European governments have passed major legislation to regulate pro­
cedural rule-making. Among them are the wave of legislation on 
codetermination and union and management rights and obligations 
in Sweden in the 1970s, the 1982 Auroux laws in France, the expanded 
procedural legislation enacted in West Germany in the 1970s, and the 
Labour and Tory legislation of the 1970s and 1980s in Britain.
The authors extend thanks to Roy Adams and Maurice 
Neufeld for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
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Convergence can also be seen in a number of other areas, to some 
of which we shall refer in some detail below. They include changes in 
the established position of unions, major challenges to union 
influence and in many cases union decline, concentration of union 
membership in fewer but larger unions, attempts to strengthen the 
base of union structures (local unions, stewards, bargaining rights), 
and the professionalization of high-level union offices. Other devel­
opments in collective bargaining also demonstrate convergence: 
widespread decentralization of bargaining structures and practices, 
employer strategies to decentralize and to weaken and/or neutralize 
union influence, and increasing public sector unionization and col­
lective bargaining in the U.S., thus narrowing the once substantial 
contrast with Western Europe. International developments such as 
the spread of nationally based works councils as well as European 
works councils through the implementation of the so-called social 
dimension in the European Union further illustrate the convergence 
trend.
At the same time, however, rapidly changing world markets are 
bringing about a widespread decentralization of bargaining that is 
giving rise to, and accentuating, plant- and firm-level diversity in in­
dustrial relations. New production organization (just-in-time sup­
plier networks, outsourcing, shop floor teamwork) and new 
microelectronic technologies depend on the active participation of 
individual employees and in many cases of local unions or works 
councils; and an expanding base-level participation gives rise to great 
local and cross-national diversity. Successful innovations in both 
work organization and industrial relations are usually based on par­
ticular local and national institutions as well as company traditions, 
which accounts for contrasting forms in different countries and at 
different firms and plants. Examples of diversity include widespread 
differences in working hours arrangements, in the role that local 
unions and/or works councils play in management decision making, 
in the strength of employee representation, in the success of employer
“individuation” strategies, in the relative success of [quality circles 
and other] team or group forms of organization, and in the relation­
ship between local and national unions, and between local and na­
tional or regional bargaining.
In addition, convergence is limited by the persistence of very differ­
ent national economic and political institutions. For instance, while 
Germany, Japan, and the United States function within a framework 
of market economics and political democracy, the specific rules, insti­
tutions, and actors regulating market and polity vary substantially 
from one country to the next. In this broader context, the roles of 
unions, employers and employers associations, collective bargaining, 
and plant-level negotiations show enduring and important cross­
national variation.
Interestingly, similar forces are at work driving both convergence 
and diversity. Convergence is driven by international competition and 
new technologies, by the ongoing internationalization of industrial re­
lations through multinational firms, by international networks linking 
unions, employers, employer associations, and governments, and by 
the beginnings of international or regional compacts and standards, 
especially in Europe. One important aspect of convergence is the 
widespread devolution of bargaining to sectoral, firm, and even plant 
levels. Yet this decentralization produces and reinforces considerable 
diversity in cross-national and local industrial relations. This is espe­
cially true as decentralization takes place in the varying contexts of 
substantially different national institutions.
Our aim in this paper is to lay out the contours of both conver­
gence and diversity in international and comparative industrial rela­
tions. We believe that the decades-old controversy about which of the 
two is primary has exhausted its utility in a post-Cold War world of 
uncertainty and disarray (cf. Kerr et al., i960; Chamberlain, 1961; 
Armingeon, 1991; Troy, 1992; Poole, 1993). Rather, we need to specify 
what is converging cross-nationally and what is diverging—empirical 
questions—and most importantly, why. Explanation requires the de­
velopment and testing of specific hypotheses, for which comparative 
analysis is particularly well suited.
Convergence
Convergence is an elusive concept, as is its counterpart—divergence, 
or diversity—especially when they are conscripted, as is the case here, 
to illuminate complex developments affecting a number of countries 
that exhibit a remarkable range of contrasts and similarities in their 
industrial relations systems. Ferner and Hyman’s equivocation sums it 
up well: “There has been convergence of systems in some respects, but 
increased diversity in others” (1992). Here we want to explore first 
some convergence trends in the countries of Western Europe and 
North America—a group roughly corresponding to the membership 
of the OECD.
In the 1960s the idea of convergence became closely associated 
with the work of Clark Kerr and his collaborators—John Dunlop, 
Frederick Harbison, and Charles Myers—in what was at first called 
the “ Inter-University Study of Labor Problems in Economic 
Development” (Kerr et al., i960). These four labor economists, ini­
tially interested chiefly in problems of industrial relations and trade 
unionism as related to economic development, built on earlier work 
by Dunlop (1958) and other members of the Inter-University Study 
(Kerr and Siegel, 1955; Harbison and Myers, 1959) in making the func­
tioning of industrial society the principal focus of their concern. Was 
there, they asked, a certain order, a logic, in a process that seemed al­
most everywhere—whether East or West, or even South—to lead to 
the emergence of an industrial type of society? Which “elites” in in­
dustrializing and preindustrializing societies were destined to become 
the initiators of the process leading to new social systems (industrial­
ism)? How did they go about it? And irrespective of initial differences 
in national contexts, leadership, and ideology, did industrial societies 
tend to grow apart as they became ever more industrialized? Or did 
they exhibit, in due course, increasing similarities? In other words, did 
they converge? The answer by Kerr and associates, to which they 
clung over the years despite much criticism (see for example 
Gourevitch et al., 1984), was an unqualified affirmative.
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Eventually the focus of the inquiry shifted from the initial concern 
with questions of interest principally to labor economists to a much 
broader quest. It became instead a search for the factors that seemed to 
account for an apparently ever-closer rapprochement between Western 
(capitalist) and Eastern (communist) countries, particularly in terms 
of their overall development pattern. This change to a broader set o f , 
questions was reflected in the decision to change the title of the project 
from the 1960s onward to “ The Inter-University Study of Human 
Resources in National Development” (Cochrane, 1979).
Fifteen years after publishing their much-noticed work entitled 
Industrialism and Industrial Man (Kerr et al., i960), the group issued 
its Final Report (Dunlop et al., 1975). While conceding that several of 
their earlier themes regarding the formation of industrial societies 
had not stood the test of time and needed to be reformulated, they in­
sisted that their conclusions with regard to the convergence of indus­
trial systems merited a renewed statement of support. “ Industrialized 
systems,” they asserted, “tend toward partial, multiway convergence 
over a long period of time.” Some years later, Clark Kerr again ex­
pressed confidence in the inevitability of the convergence process 
when, in the course of a series of lectures, he stressed “the tendency of 
[industrial] societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in 
structures, processes, and performances” (Kerr, 1983).
It should be understood that, for the Kerr group, convergence was 
not required to be a state of perfect identity. Convergence was, in­
stead, “concerned with the general direction of movement rather than 
current status alone” (Kerr, 1983:34). The central issue, thus, was not 
whether two or more situations were at any given time the same or 
not, “but whether they are getting closer to each other over time, al­
though perhaps still far apart” (Kerr, 1983).
Supporters of the convergence thesis have continued to stress that 
convergence need not be total, but that partial change may also con­
stitute valid evidence. For example, Reinhard Skinner argues that “to 
deny similarities altogether in the name of differences is to fall into
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the trap of total historical and cultural relativism. In short, conver­
gence need not be ‘total’ and differences as well as similarities need to 
be taken into account” (Skinner, 1976). And in his most recent assess­
ment Kerr was prepared to agree that neither convergence nor diver­
sity would ever become the dominant force: “ There will be constant 
adjustments between these eternally conflicting themes, but no per­
manent settlement” (Kerr, 1983: 296).
How does convergence relate to the area of industrial relations? 
What is there in industrial relations that may reasonably be expected 
to converge? There are no “protected” areas, no inherent restrictions. 
The operation of the labor market, the structuring of the legal frame­
work, the role entrusted to government, the rules governing collective 
bargaining, the policies of the organizations representing employer 
and employee interests—all are capable of converging. Indeed, in re­
cent decades some of the once striking contrasts between Western in­
dustrial relations systems—especially between the continental 
countries of Western Europe and North America—appear to have be­
come markedly less clear-cut. Convergence trends become particu­
larly noticeable when one examines the role of law and government, 
the position of trade unions in society, and certain key attributes of 
collective bargaining.
We shall consider, first, the role of law and government. Until the 
1930s and into the 1960s, the role of law in the American system of in­
dustrial relations was primarily concerned with the resolution of pro­
cedural conflicts. The law prescribed procedures for determining the 
appropriate unit for collective bargaining, the principles for selection 
of an exclusive bargaining agent to represent the employees in a 
defined bargaining unit, and the boundaries separating permissible 
from proscribed conduct by the parties. By contrast, the substantive 
terms and conditions under which work was performed were left to 
the outcome of negotiations between the parties, who were to be 
helped along in their attempts to reach agreement by public or private 
agencies with special competence in resolving industrial disputes. In 
any event, the main body of American labor relations law, as promul­
gated first in the Wagner Act (1935) and subsequently the Taft-Hartley
Act (1947), determined the basic procedural rules governing the rela­
tions between the parties, while the substantive terms of the employ­
ment relationship were left predominantly to negotiations between 
the parties. Comparing European with American labor relations law, 
Derek Bok pointed out that “legislators in the United States have been 
more concerned with regulating and promoting collective bargaining 
and less inclined to pass laws that actually fix the terms and condi­
tions of employment” (Bok, 1971:1417).
To be sure, there were exceptions. The U.S. government did estab­
lish some important substantive standards, among them particularly 
the minimum terms of employment that were contained in the Fair 
Wages and Hours Act (1938), but that legislation and related items had 
far more significance for the non-union sectors than for industries 
and occupations where collective bargaining to set the terms and con­
ditions of work was well established or about to become so.
In most Western European countries the situation was to a large 
extent and for a long time almost exactly the reverse. The formulation 
of procedural rules was more often than not left to be worked out by 
the parties—for example, regarding the presence of shop stewards in 
the workplace and the rights they were granted to perform their 
tasks — while the role of the state centered on the promulgation of 
substantive employment conditions, usually in the form of legally 
binding minimum standards. An important exception, one among a 
few, was the German codetermination legislation which prescribed in 
considerable detail the rules governing the operation of the works 
council system. But in Britain, France, and other countries, though not 
in Germany, such eminently procedural issues as employer recogni­
tion of employee organizations for purposes of collective bargaining 
remained ultimately—that is, in the event of unbridgeable disagree­
ments—within the decision-making prerogatives of employers, al­
though in Britain union strength was often a match for the employer 
side. This was, of course, also far removed from practice in the United 
States, where procedural controversies were usually referred to spe­
cialized administrative agencies operating within the framework of 
public policies and judicial decisions.
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But since the 1950s and 1960s a significant bilateral reversal in how 
government plays its role in industrial relations has occurred. In the 
United States, where historically the state had largely abstained from 
major interventions in substantive rule-making, the legal framework 
was expanded by incorporating a large body of substantive law, prin­
cipally in the area of employment legislation (Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act, 1964; Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1970; 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 1974; Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Act, 1988). Several of the leading Western 
European countries enacted legislation reflecting a previously uncom­
mon readiness to formulate rules covering the procedural relations 
between the parties in the labor market.
In some instances, of which Britain is probably the foremost exam­
ple, the enlarged governmental role in the procedural area brought 
about considerable changes in the industrial relations system. To be 
sure, an initial attempt in that country to introduce a comprehensive 
set of procedural rules through the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, 
whose key provisions were adapted from the American Taft-Hartley 
Act in a striking demonstration of convergence, was an utter failure, 
not least because employers were reluctant to make energetic use of 
the opportunities which the 1971 act afforded them.
Repeal of the 1971 act after a few ill-fated years was followed by a 
renewed and tactically much superior effort under Margaret 
Thatcher’s inspiration to use legislation in the 1980s in order to widen 
the area covered by procedural regulations. Voluntarism, which had 
been the dominant principle of British labor-management relations 
since at least 1906, was gradually superseded by a string of legal pre­
scriptions laying down the terms under which unions would hence­
forth conduct their dealings with employers and their own members, 
in particular the Employment Acts of 1980,1982,1988,1989, and 1990; 
the Trade Union Act of 1984; and the Wages Act of 1986, plus several 
statutory Codes of Practice (Ferner and Hyman, 1992). Standing out 
in the new rules were, in particular, limits on secondary boycotts and 
stranger picketing, required postal ballots for compulsory prestrike 
votes, mandatory balloting procedures for candidates for policymak­
ing union positions, restrictive conditions for the maintenance of 
union-directed political funds, and the virtual elimination of closed 
shops—all matters that under British law and practice had previously 
been left to determination by the parties themselves.
Also illustrative of similarities between American and British in­
dustrial relations was the formation in 1974 of a British statutory 
body—the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) — 
as an agency financed by public funds but, like the U.S. Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service, serving the needs of the parties 
in the industrial relations system. Interestingly, the statutory duty to 
promote collective bargaining, which the law imposes on ACAS, bears 
a close resemblance to the introductory language of the Taft-Hartley 
Act, and ACAS recommendations to settle a dispute may not be com­
pelled to conform to government policies.
Considering that the Labour party, while in opposition, had indi­
cated its intention to retain much of the Conservative party’s proce­
dural legislation in the event Labour became the party of government, 
it would appear that the part played by public policies in establishing 
the procedural rules for the British industrial relations system has 
been decisively and probably permanently enlarged. At the same time, 
the area traditionally left to rules shaped jointly by the parties is nar­
rowing. In other words, the legislation of the 1980s has put a very large 
dent in the historic ability of the parties to construct their own proce­
dural rules free of government intervention.
Several other European countries have similarly enlarged the gov­
ernment’s procedural rule-making role by legislation covering issues 
previously left mainly to the parties to resolve. In Sweden a series of 
laws enacted in the 1970s included shop steward rights in the work­
place, employee membership on corporate boards of directors, the 
elimination of traditional management prerogatives (as for example 
by the introduction of statutory codetermination, 1976), and manda­
tory negotiations to settle certain conditions of employment. The leg­
islation represented a major revision of the traditional “freedom of the 
labor market,” which means that to the largest extent possible the par­
ties make their own procedural and substantive rules. And similar to
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the situation in Great Britain, no efforts were made by the political op­
position, after it became the party of government (1976 to 1982), to re­
peal or at least modify the procedural legislation.
In France, a country without a tradition of voluntarism or so-called 
freedom of the labor market, the state has long played an active role, 
procedurally and substantively, in industrial relations. Nevertheless, the 
four “Auroux laws” —enacted in 1982-83 and carrying the name of the 
minister of labor in office at that time—went even further than previ­
ous efforts in attempting to bring about incisive changes in dealings be­
tween employers and employees at the level of the workplace, including 
the introduction of a novel “duty to bargain” at local or plant levels. 
Here, too, when political parties representing the conservative forces in 
society gained and held office from 1986 to 1988, and then returned to 
office again in 1993, they made no attempt to overturn the Auroux legis­
lation. Finally, codetermination legislation enacted in West Germany in 
1972 and 1976 introduced significant changes in the procedural rules 
regulating the industrial relations system. It included, in particular, a 
significant expansion of works council rights, a strengthening of the 
unions position in relation to the works council, and the addition of 
rules concerning the role of the supervisory boards.
In sum, while European governments in recent decades resorted to 
legislation to prescribe the terms under which the parties in industrial 
relations are supposed to deal with each other, and while they moved 
closer to American practice in prescribing procedural matters—such 
as the decentralization of collective bargaining to enterprise and 
subenterprise levels, the formation of independent public bodies 
(such as the ACAS) to resolve industrial disputes, and the regulation 
ofthe collective bargaining process (Auroux) — American industrial 
relations legislation enacted at about the same time concerned itself 
mainly with the kind of substantive issues that most European coun­
tries have long entrusted to the legislative process.
Additional similarities have marked the policies of trade unions in 
Western industrialized countries during the past few decades. Almost
without exception, the decade of the 1970s was one of rising member­
ship ranks, absolutely and relatively. In several countries an all-time 
membership peak was reached in 1979. Likewise, when in the 1980s a 
long period of stagnation or decline in membership began, that too 
became the common experience of most trade unions. Very few orga­
nizations were able to increase their ranks. As Jelle Visser (1991) 
pointed out, the unions in “virtually all OECD countries have contin­
ued to experience reduced or negative membership growth,” although 
in a few countries the decline now seems to have been arrested.
The most important exception to the general trend was the 
German trade union federation (DBG). Its affiliated unions demon­
strated a basic membership stability quite unlike that of most other 
trade union organizations; and with German unification, these unions 
enrolled a large number of new eastern members. By the mid-1990s, 
however, even unified Germany was experiencing overall union mem­
bership decline.
Explanations of widespread membership decline tend to cite simi­
lar factors: shrinking employment in traditionally well-organized in­
dustries, changing work processes, increased employer reliance on 
part-time and temporary workers, more aggressive management, and 
restrictive public policies. Countervailing union policies often tend 
toward convergence insofar as remedial measures are intended to 
consolidate union structures. Reducing the number of unions while 
increasing simultaneously the size and strength of the individual or­
ganizations has been a widely shared goal, although attempts at unify­
ing dual or multiple central trade union federations have been 
generally unsuccessful, probably because of deeply rooted ideological 
loyalties and strong occupational or professional identities. Far more 
productive have been the efforts in Britain, Sweden, Australia, the 
United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, and other countries to bring 
weak unions under the wings of stronger ones and to encourage 
mergers of national unions in related industries or occupations. The 
objective has usually been to emulate the German/Austrian model of 
a limited number—between fifteen and twenty—of financially self- 
sufficient unions.
Less noticeable but not negligible have been the efforts in several 
European countries, notably in Sweden and the United Kingdom, to 
consolidate fragmented local and workplace organizations along lines 
characteristic of the United States. The aims have been (1) to improve 
the resource base generally available only to larger and stronger local 
organizations; (2) to add substantive content to their mainly adminis­
trative tasks; (3) to enable them to be more responsive to the changing 
agenda of management; (4) to provide improved services for mem­
bers; and (5) to redress the balance of power between management 
and labor in the workplace. Whether these aims can be achieved re­
mains still to be seen, but there can be little doubt that local unions 
have welcomed this at least potentially significant enlargement of their 
traditionally subordinate role and that central union bodies have had 
to scramble in order to maintain their areas of authority and compe­
tence (Katz, 1993; Turner, 1991).
Gradually a new generation of union leaders is rising to positions 
of high office in all industrialized countries. Their qualifications 
match their grasp of the issues at stake in increasingly competitive 
markets, and their ability to master new forms of production organi­
zation is superior to that of their predecessors. Not much has been 
written about this development, but it is evident—in fact, it has been 
evident for some time already—that union office has become a profes­
sion whose exercise requires more than the traditional qualifications 
made up mainly of political skills. Increasingly, formal study and ap­
propriate training are necessary steps in the career pattern of aspi­
rants to high union position. It is no longer uncommon for union 
leaders to hold degrees in economics, law, and other professions, and 
the positions they occupy on corporate boards of directors—whether 
by legal mandate or the provisions of a collective agreement—require 
them to be knowledgeable about matters of managerial strategy and 
corporate finance.
Moreover, it is no longer possible, at least not in the large majority 
of countries, for union leaders simultaneously to hold high union 
office and to sit in national or regional legislative bodies as representa­
tives of labor-oriented political parties. Full-time attention to their
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union position is expected nowadays, in fact is required by the rising 
demands of union office. In this respect, then, European unions have 
become much more like their American counterparts.
Essential to the activities of unions is the shape of the bargaining 
structure, and though it would be difficult to identify a universal 
trend, there can be little question that over the past fifteen to twenty 
years most changes in the formerly centralized structures of collective 
bargaining have tended toward more decentralization. A distinct con­
vergence pattern has appeared, indeed is still disseminating its effects. 
Where economy-wide bargaining once dominated the system of col­
lective bargaining, as it did in the Scandinavian countries or the 
Netherlands, there has been a downward shift more recently toward 
industry-wide bargaining, and where industry-wide bargaining was 
once the rule, its preeminence has been diluted or even replaced by 
bargaining at the level of the industrial plant or even the workplace 
(Visser, 1991).
To be sure, not all countries have been affected equally by this 
trend. For example, industry-wide bargaining at regional levels con­
tinues to be characteristic of German collective bargaining. But as 
Katz points out after closely examining developments in six countries, 
there are many similarities in the ongoing structural changes, virtu­
ally all pointing toward decentralization (Katz, 1993), while, interest­
ingly, “ there were no major counter-examples to the decentralization 
movement.” In other words, there was no significant recentralization.
Diversity
Yet in spite of convergence along a number of important dimensions, 
there is arguably as much or more cross-national variation in indus­
trial relations as ever. This is fortunate for comparative-minded social 
scientists whose research agendas are therefore not limited to describ­
ing and explaining either similarity or variation. There is plenty to do 
in both areas. It is the argument of this section that there are at least 
two critical sources of variation in industrial relations: (1) the
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persistence of contrasting national models of economic and political 
organization; and (2) a widespread decentralization of bargaining and 
related flowering of local diversity. The former refers to national insti­
tutions that are products of long histories and therefore are resistant 
to change, with an important shaping influence on industrial relations 
practices, outcomes, and possibilities. The latter refers to more recent 
circumstances brought on by changing world markets and employer- 
• led production reorganization.
In the post-World War II period, the convergence perspective of 
the 1950s and 1960s was rooted in a dominant structural-functionalist 
social science. Industrial relations scholars gave this perspective (or 
“paradigm,” as it came to be called; Kuhn, 1962) rich expression. In the 
long run, in their view, industrial development should lead to similar 
(or at least functionally equivalent) political and economic structures, 
as these structures develop to serve the parallel functions that indus­
trialism everywhere requires. While Kerr et al. have been 
caricatured—they did in fact recognize continuing cultural diversity 
and national differences—the weight of the analysis pushes in the di­
rection of long-term convergence.
Perhaps the biggest weakness of the industrialism perspective was 
its assumption that similar tasks would require similar institutions 
and policies. Neil Chamberlains 1961 critique has stood the test of 
time: industrialism offered no clear theory or testable hypotheses 
(Chamberlain, 1961). To the extent that one can test the theory, there 
remain very substantial differences in IR processes and outcomes, 
even among the most advanced industrial societies (compare German 
social partnership, Japanese enterprise unionism, and American 
“transformation” ). Thirty years of industrial development did not 
make the Soviet Union look like the U.S.A., and even now that com­
mand communism has collapsed, it remains unlikely that the Russian 
economy (including IR) will converge in form or substance with 
European, North American, or East Asian market economies.
In the 1970s, a literature on “corporatism” emerged to challenge the 
assumptions of both pluralist and Marxist theories of convergence. 
(Important early works were Schmitter, 1974; Wilensky, 1976; 
Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979; Berger, 1981; Goldthorpe, 1984a, 
1984b; and Katzenstein, 1985.) In this view, political and economic 
processes and outcomes are powerfully shaped by the specific ways in 
which interests are organized, their structures, relations, and ideolo­
gies. Especially important are employers, unions, and the state, and 
the ways in which they are structured and interact. Although some of 
the corporatist literature implied convergence toward a more corpo- 
ratist model (and a more “organized capitalism” ), the weight of the 
literature was on entrenched, institutionally based national differ­
ences, ranging from most corporatist (Sweden, Norway, Austria, the 
Netherlands) to most pluralist (the U.S. and the U.K.).
Building on this literature but moving beyond it came a new “his­
torical institutionalism” that derived political and economic outcomes 
to a large extent from national institutional frameworks (cf. Zysman, 
1983; Hall, 1986; Turner, 1991; Steinmo et al., 1992). For industrial rela­
tions, this approach drew on the earlier institutional and comparative 
work of John R. Commons (1934) and Everett Kassalow (1969). With 
growing international capital and trade flows, however, along with 
specific economic integration projects such as the European single 
market and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
the collapse of communist command economies, others predicted the 
decline of national institutions and perhaps increasing convergence 
around a more deregulated market model of political economy 
(Streeck, 1991). Nonetheless, by the early I990S, national institutions 
and differences in arenas such as industrial relations appeared as im­
portant as ever (Armingeon, 1991; Rhodes, 1991; Due et al., 1991). 
Theorists such as David Soskice continued to work fruitfully with 
frameworks of analysis based on contrasting national models. In this 
view, strong German employer associations and industrial unions are 
key actors in the fabric of a “coordinated market economy,” whereas 
fragmented employer and union strength in the United States is a
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defining feature of the liberal or “non-coordinated market economy” 
(Soskice, 1990).
Parallel to the rise of a corporatist and national models literature, 
economic crisis in the 1970s and early 1980s gave birth to another lit­
erature on new production organization. Again beginning with a cri­
tique of Kerr et a l, scholars such as Boyer (1988), Lipietz (1979), Piore 
and Sabel (1984), and Kern and Schumann (1984) argued that the in­
dustrialism perspective had outlived its usefulness, as the Fordist 
mass production of goods and services began to break down. In this 
view, economic crisis was in large part a product of the exhaustion of 
the Fordist model of production organization. As new forms became 
dominant (whether “ flexible specialization,” “ flexible automation,” 
“ lean production,” or a myriad of other variations or vocabularies that 
attempted to define the central features of post-Fordist production or­
ganization), new institutional arrangements would be necessary for 
economic, social, and political regulation. New production organiza­
tion, in other words, would require new kinds of unionism, bargain­
ing structures, and other aspects of industrial relations.
Some of the “new production organization” work implies a new 
kind of convergence. Thus the early work of French regulationists saw 
the dominant Fordist system of regulation (a broad term that encom­
passes capital markets, government economic and social policy, col­
lective bargaining, and much else) breaking down, to be replaced by a 
new framework yet to be developed (Howell, 1992). SabePs (1982) flex­
ible specialization perspective implies a generalized breakup of large 
firms into smaller units, linked together in new networks of mutual 
support. But the weight of this literature is on diversity. Boyer (1990), 
for example, identifies a number of different new models of national 
regulation. Katz (1993) identifies and documents a widespread trend 
toward decentralization of bargaining, as employers pursue new 
forms of production and work organization. And Locke (1990) sees 
great local-level diversity of industrial relations resulting from all this 
decentralization, both within and across nations, so much so that he 
wonders if there even are national models anymore.
If scholars in these two post-Kerr directions of analysis are right, 
we are a long way from convergence along important dimensions of 
political economy, including industrial relations. Cross-national dif­
ferences may be as important as ever, underpinned by growing decen­
tralization and diversity at the plant and firm levels. These are, of 
course, empirical questions.
In the remainder of this section, we look at some of the evidence’ 
indicating persistent diversity and suggest hypotheses to explain the 
variations.
National Models
In the broadest sense, numerous authors have described and analyzed 
contrasting cross-national political-economic structures, including 
systems of industrial relations. Although a full presentation of national 
differences is beyond the scope of this essay, there are two partially 
overlapping dimensions along which countries may be grouped (and 
both of these are really continuums with groupings toward either end 
that can be marked off as distinct categories). One dimension is the 
extent to which the political economy is more or less coordinated (by 
close interrelationships and/or reinforcing policies of governments, 
financial institutions, and the collective bargaining partners; Soskice, 
1990). The second dimension, essential from an industrial relations 
point of view, is the extent to which organized labor is included with 
an influential voice in bargaining and government policy.
In the 1980s, many analysts looking backward in time associated 
more organized, inclusive structures (sometimes called “democratic 
corporatist” ; Katzenstein, 1985) with superior economic performance 
(Schmidt, 1982; Cameron, 1984; Wilensky and Turner, 1987). While 
the decline of the Swedish model and the general recession in the 
early I990S appeared to cut the ground from under arguments of rela­
tive economic superiority, analysts continued to identify persistently 
distinct national political, economic, and industrial relations struc­
tures (see, for example, Wilson, 1990). In the industrial relations liter­
ature, national differences continued to occupy a central place
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(Windmuller et al., 1987; Bamber and Lansbury, 1987; Baglioni and 
Crouch, 1990; Ferner and Hyman, 1992). And the long-term strong 
economic performance— reflected in export levels, trade surpluses, 
and economic growth— of more organized, lab or-inclusive countries 
such as West Germany and Japan vis-a-vis less organized, labor- 
fragmented countries such as the United States and Great Britain gave 
continuing support to a linkage between national differences and 
economic performance.
For industrial relations, the important contribution of Katz and 
Sabel (1985) showed how contrasting institutions could have very dif­
ferent effects in an era of industrial restructuring and work reorgani­
zation. In the United States, where local union influence is based in 
part on job control (regulating seniority-based allocation of multiple 
job classifications), flexible new work organization can threaten union 
power. Managerial initiatives to reorganize can set off conflict with 
varying possible outcomes, ranging from a new labor-management 
accommodation to stalled reorganization and to new union-free 
workplaces. In Japan and West Germany, by contrast, where local 
union influence in the plants is based in part on employment security 
and worker participation (through enterprise unions in Japan and 
through the works councils in Germany), allocation of labor is more 
flexible, and processes of work reorganization cause less conflict and 
pose less of a threat to unions.
Although Katz and Sabel gloss over the very substantial differences 
between Japan and Germany (Japanese employers have considerably 
more flexibility in this regard than do German employers, who are 
constrained by works councils with legally mandated codetermina­
tion rights), their central point is as valid as ever: not only do different 
countries have contrasting industrial relations institutions and prac­
tices, but these differences matter importantly for outcomes ranging 
from the success or failure of shop floor reorganization to the rise or 
fall of union influence.
Wolfgang Streeck takes the argument a step further. In his view, in­
dustrial relations institutions and practices in some countries operate
as part of a mutually reinforcing “virtuous circle,” while in other coun­
tries contrasting institutions and practices have the opposite effect. 
Explaining the West German auto industry boom of the 1980s (in the 
face of expert predictions of the industry’s demise), Streeck argues 
that works council/union-imposed labor-market rigidities (no lay­
offs) pushed firms upmarket toward diversified quality production 
(DQP), with positive results both for competitiveness and union 
influence (Streeck, 1987; see also Turner, 1991: 24-25). External labor- 
market rigidity combined with internal flexibility (for plant-level re­
organization) work together with an extensive vocational training 
system, comprehensive collective bargaining coverage, and other ele­
ments of the German political economy (such as long-term bank 
financing) to reinforce positive outcomes. In the British case, by con­
trast, a very different framework of institutions and practices rein­
forced each other in the 1970s and 1980s in a vicious cycle of 
economic, industrial, and union decline.
In other analyses, Pontusson (1990) has shown the very different 
roles that unions played in 1980s work reorganization in the auto in­
dustry in Britain and Sweden (unilateral management initiative versus 
growing union engagement). Freeman (1989a, 1989b) analyzes persis­
tently divergent union membership density rates and demonstrates a 
causal connection between those contrasting levels and the institu­
tions that govern labor relations. Turner (1991) examines contrasting 
cross-national union influence in contemporary processes of work re­
organization, and argues that the extent of union influence and the 
stability of industrial relations are products of the extent to which 
unions are institutionally integrated into management decision­
making processes.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of convergence is the point 
that as markets become more integrated, similar organizational forms 
will naturally follow in time. Thus one would predict, for example, 
industrial relations convergence in the European Union and perhaps 
even the emergence of a distinctive European system of industrial 
relations—especially now with the coming of the single market. While 
this may occur in the future, so far there is little evidence to support
such a notion. Armingeon (1991) specifically tested the convergence 
thesis for the European Community, using data from 1962 to 1990 for 
all twelve countries for union membership and structure, strikes, wage 
structure, public sector share of total employment, and major collec­
tive bargaining procedural rules. He found that for all variables, cross­
national differences are at least as important in 1990 as earlier, and 
found no support for the emergence of a European system of labor 
relations.
Why is this so? Because institutions, as products of specific national 
histories and political battles, are resistant to change (Steinmo et al., 
1992). As Michael Poole puts it, arguing for the prominence of diver­
gence over convergence in national systems of industrial relations, in­
stitutions acquire a certain autonomy from the environment, even in 
periods of considerable economic and political change (Poole, 1993: 
110-11). These “sticky” institutions are in turn bound up in contrasting 
national patterns of industrial organization, which persist even through 
major reorganization and transformation (Herrigel, 1989; Lane, 1991).
Local D iversity
In addition to the national models anti-convergence school, there is 
considerable contemporary analysis of the phenomenon of decentral­
ization in collective bargaining. In some cases, such analysts disagree 
sharply with national models theorists, seeing in processes of decen­
tralization a declining importance of national institutions. The title of 
a recent work by Richard Locke is particularly suggestive in this re­
gard: “Searching for a New National Model in a World Where They No 
Longer Exist” (Locke, 1993). While we think that national institutions 
do in fact continue to be important in shaping industrial relations 
practices and outcomes, we would also argue that both national mod­
els and decentralization/local diversity theorists capture an important 
part of the truth. Both point toward industrial relations diversity 
rather than convergence.
For decentralization theorists, it is not so much cross-national con­
trasts that are important as it is local diversity, both within and across 
borders. Building on the work of Sabel (1982), Locke (1990) for exam-
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pie finds widely divergent patterns of industrial relations within Italy, 
depending on local institutions and histories, as well as on particular 
local-national relationships (especially for local unions). Herrigel 
(1989), who develops the useful concept of distinctive “industrial or­
ders,” finds equally divergent patterns within West Germany across re­
gions, even for the same industry (machine-building). Differences 
here are based on historically divergent paths of development, for 
company structures and interrelationships as well as for the type of 
unionism and role of the local government.
Looking at a wide range of evidence and literature, Katz (1993) syn­
thesizes the findings of numerous others and determines that there is 
indeed a widespread decentralization of collective bargaining struc­
ture. Evaluating possible explanations, Katz hypothesizes that the 
main force behind this pervasive industrial relations change is the 
drive toward new work organization. Although Katz does not empha­
size this point, it is reasonable to assume that if decentralization is 
spreading, an increasing diversity of industrial relations outcomes and 
practices will follow. Such differences are readily apparent in a 
plethora of plant- and firm-level variation in contingent pay schemes, 
employee participation programs, shop floor and office teamwork 
arrangements, work schedules, union and/or works council voice in 
company decision making, and the balance between full- and part- 
time or temporary employees in the workforce. If decentralization 
trends persist, such substantive variation is likely to grow.
Toward a Theory of Change
Concepts such as convergence or growing diversity imply change. Yet 
change is one of the hardest things for social scientists to explain.
Thus when Kerr et al. (i960) explained long-term convergence by ref­
erence to generic processes of industrialization, the picture was too 
broad and the outcomes too varied for subsequent research to fill in 
the details and verify the argument.
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There is a similar risk in contemporary “black box” notions of 
“globalization.” Nonetheless, we think the preceding discussion makes 
possible the development of testable hypotheses that point toward a 
theory of change in contemporary industrial relations.
While industrialism emphasized national processes of industrial 
development and regulation, globalization refers to a qualitative leap 
in the expansion of markets beyond national boundaries and the ca­
pacities of national governments for regulation. Both industrialization 
and globalization arise from the expansion of markets, but in the for­
mer case this expansion occurs most importantly in the consolidation 
of national markets, while in the latter case the expansion occurs most 
importantly beyond national boundaries.
To summarize our argument, the internationalization of markets 
and ideas is the driving force for contemporary change in systems of 
both industrial organization and industrial relations. This part of the 
argument is consistent with the analyses of a wide range of scholars, 
from Piore and Sabel (1984) to Troy (1992). Globalization promotes a 
convergence of form and substance in particular industrial relations 
practices. At the same time, globalization drives employers every­
where to reorganize production and work, setting off a widespread, 
“convergent” process of bargaining decentralization.
We continue to observe, nonetheless, widely divergent practices and 
outcomes in industrial relations, especially in cross-national compar­
isons. Persistent (and in some instances growing) diversity can be ex­
plained in two ways. On the one hand, while globalization drives 
“convergent” decentralization, this very decentralization promotes 
widespread diversity as local initiatives and bargaining adapt to 
specifically local and national conditions. On the other hand, en­
trenched institutions that vary considerably across national bound­
aries have important and contrasting effects on the direction of 
change.
Another way to state the argument is as follows: market forces drive 
convergence in industrial relations, while both a decentralization of 
bargaining and contrasting national institutions refract change into 
diverse channels.
Directions for Future Research
Given the widespread nature of both convergence and diversity, we 
think that broad theoretical speculation, even if empirically well 
grounded, concerning which process is primary is probably no longer 
fruitful. Instead, we would suggest comparative studies of both simi­
larity and variation, aiming at explanations that can be linked to 
broader theoretical development. Such cross-national studies can be 
and have been used to help revitalize the field of industrial relations 
(in areas such as strategic choice) as well as contribute to related fields, 
such as comparative political economy and political sociology.
In comparative studies of variation, we need to examine contend­
ing explanations that shed light on broader economic, political, and 
social processes at work. When we find significant cross-national vari­
ation, what explanations work best: institutional? economic? political? 
cultural? nationally or locally based? or some combination? For exam­
ple, why does one find cross-national variation in rates of employer 
innovation? Can this be traced to relative market openness, and/or to 
the extent of competition from Japan or the newly industrialized 
countries, or others? Is average firm or plant size (which varies cross- 
nationally) relevant as an explanation? Are industrial relations vari­
ables important, such as union strength or relative IR adversity or 
partnership? Are other institutions of industrial relations, the econ­
omy, or the polity critical? What about cultural differences: can tests 
be devised to capture the significance of cultural variables?
Studies of variation can also group countries according to typolo­
gies or similar outcomes, adding credibility or further tests to expla­
nations that may be derived from the study of two or three countries. 
Or international studies can undertake comparative analysis that be­
gins from a multinational base. What can we learn, along these lines, 
by comparing the European single market with NAFTA? Why, for ex­
ample, does the EU, composed of fifteen very diverse countries (di­
verse in economic development, political history, institutional 
framework), have a much more substantial “social dimension” (Social 
Charter, Maastricht social protocol, substantial international health 
and safety regulations, a blossoming Euro-works council movement,
an active European Trade Union Confederation) than the three 
NAFTA countries? Is this simply because economic integration has 
been under way much longer in the EU? Is it because of stronger so­
cial-democratic traditions? stronger unions? a labor-management 
partnership orientation? position in world markets? or other eco­
nomic, political, social, or cultural factors?
One promising approach to the study of cross-national differences 
is the call by Richard Locke and Kathleen Thelen (1996) for “contextu­
alized comparisons.” In this approach, one begins with comparative 
studies of the national context of industrial relations so as then to 
determine the crucial conflict or issue at a particular time. In a flexible 
way, one then compares the outcomes of such conflict cross-nationally, 
to gain insight into contrasting national and/or local processes at 
work. Although this may seem like comparing unequal entities, in fact 
it maybe less so than, for example, a cross-national study of strike 
rates that fails to consider the very different meaning of strikes in dif­
ferent countries.
For comparative studies of similarity, we need to identify carefully 
where the similarities are that seem to make sense, and then explain 
them. Harry Katz, for example, identifies a broad, cross-national 
trend toward decentralization in industrial relations. He discusses 
three contending explanations for this trend: a market-driven imper­
ative for new work organization; managerial offensives in an era of 
union weakness; and the expansion of work reorganization and par­
ticipatory programs (1993). Katz presents reasons why he thinks that 
the first explanation makes most sense, but this needs further testing. 
How can we operationalize these and other possible explanations for 
cross-national testing? What data do we need in order to sort out the 
most appropriate explanation? What can we learn from such an ex­
planation about the critical economic, political, and social forces at 
work in contemporary society?
As another example of cross-national similarity, what accounts for 
the rather widespread expansion of procedural regulation in indus­
trial relations? Since this has occurred in countries where unions are 
weak (France) as well as where unions are, or at least were, strong
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(Britain), there must be other explanations at work. We have de­
scribed this trend in several countries above, but what is the decisive 
driving force or forces: markets? cross-national learning? institutional 
consolidation? economic development?
In many cases, studies of similarity and variation can be usefully 
paired. For example, it might be useful to examine the following hy­
potheses together:
1. The growing significance of supranational political institutions, as 
exemplified by the European Union, and their ability to promulgate 
rules binding on their constituents tend to strengthen the forces 
leading toward convergence.
2. On the other hand, market factors, including particularly the 
accelerating search for ever more efficient forms of work organiza­
tion and production, tend to favor the development of increasing 
diversity.
Note that the first hypothesis, if valid for the period since the EC 
“relaunch” in 1985-86, would contradict the longer-term finding of 
Klaus Armingeon (1991), as noted above. And the second hypothesis, 
if valid across a wide range of countries for the contemporary period, 
would show the limitations of a two-country comparative analysis for 
broader theoretical claims (see for example Troy, 1992). Thus oppos­
ing hypotheses should also be tested on the basis of broad, cross­
national evidence.
Similarly, the following pair could be examined in parallel, related 
studies:
1. By and large, it is in the nature of labor organizations to pursue 
policies tending toward solidarity and equality, thus promoting 
convergence.
2. On the other hand, in the contemporary era the ever-widening 
search by employers for greater flexibility and efficiency compels 
them to promote policies supportive of divergence.
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Other individual hypotheses could consider both processes, within 
one related causal explanation, such as:
1. National governments and other national political institutions seek 
to be responsive to both sets of forces, with the outcome probably 
depending on an assessment of what best serves the national inter­
est (e.g., Britain at Maastricht).
2. Just as centralization of industrial relations structures and deci­
sion-making processes is likely to lead to convergence, so decentral­
ization probably begets diversity.
We conclude with a few comments concerning the process of re­
search and analysis itself, since research methods are of the utmost 
importance in arriving at useful findings.
First, we need careful selection and study of the proposed depen­
dent variables. Perhaps nothing is more important to useful cross­
national research. Not all questions are equally interesting or 
important. We need to ask relentlessly not just what is interesting but 
what will shed light on underlying causal forces at work in the econ­
omy and society. What exactly, and in detail, is the similarity or the 
variation? What is the range of possible explanation suggested in the 
literature and by the actors?
We also need to examine and test all plausible independent vari­
ables and combinations of variables. This sounds formal, as it should, 
although we do not mean to suggest that quantitative testing is essen­
tial. Quantitative testing requires a large N and looks at probabilities; 
comparative analysis based on case studies, without recourse to quan­
titative methods, asks what explanation fits all cases. The latter ap­
proach maybe particularly appropriate to cross-national 
comparisons in which the N is small and for which it may be impossi­
ble to operationalize variables in meaningful numerical terms. The 
methodology, in other words, should be selected to fit the questions 
asked, as well as the range and character of possible explanations.
Although international and comparative research is demanding, 
cross-national investigations of convergence and diversity continue to
offer great promise, both for vast possibilities of data collection and 
comparison and for theoretical contributions. This is especially true 
in the current period of economic and political turbulence and theo­
retical uncertainty and openness. ■
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